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8	WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  AT SEATTLE	
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10	MARICELA RAMIREZ,	CASE NO. C13-5873 RJB
11	Plaintiff,	ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECUSAL
12	v.	RECOME
13	JOHN L HART, et al.,	
14	Defendant.	
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16	On March 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed "Plaintiff's Notice of Motion and Motion for Judge to	
17	Be Disqualified or Recused." Dkt. No. 21. The presiding judge, U.S. District Judge Robert J.	
18	Bryan, reviewed the motion and declined to recuse himself voluntarily. Dkt. No. 22. In	
19	accordance with the Local Rules of this district, the matter has been referred to this Court for	
20	review. LCR 3(e).	
21	DISCUSSION	
22	Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in	
23	any proceeding in which his impartiality "might reasonably be questioned." A federal judge also	
24	shall disqualify himself in circumstances where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a	

party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. 28 U.S.C. 2 § 455(b)(1). Under both 28 U.S.C. §144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455, recusal of a federal judge is appropriate 3 if "a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Yagman v. Republic Insurance, 987 F.2d 622, 626 5 (9th Cir.1993). This is an objective inquiry concerned with whether there is the appearance of 6 7 bias, not whether there is bias in fact. Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir.1992); United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 881 (9th Cir.1980). In Liteky v. United 8 States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994), the United States Supreme Court further explained the narrow basis for recusal: 10 [J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality 11 motion. . . . [O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, 12 do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, 13 judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or 14 even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. 15 *Id.* at 555. 16 Reviewing Plaintiff's motion and accompanying documentation, it is clear that her 17 argument that Judge Bryan should recuse himself is based solely on a series of rulings with 18 which she disagrees. See Dkt. No. 21, pp. 1-2. This is not a legally sufficient basis for a recusal. 19 A judge's conduct in the context of pending judicial proceedings does not constitute the requisite 20 bias under 28 U.S.C. § 144 or § 455 if it is prompted solely by information that the judge 21 received in the context of the performance of his duties. Bias is almost never established simply 22 because the judge issued an adverse ruling. 23

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1	Plaintiff may disagree with Judge Bryan's rulings, but that is a basis for appeal, not	
2	disqualification. Upon review of the record, the Court finds that Judge Bryan's impartiality	
3	cannot reasonably be questioned. There being no evidence of bias or prejudice, Plaintiff's	
4	request for recusal is DENIED.	
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6	CONCLUSION	
7	There is no reasonable basis for a voluntary recusal in this instance.	
8	Accordingly it is hereby <b>ORDERED</b> that the undersigned <b>DENIES</b> Plaintiff's motion to recuse Judge Bryan	
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11	The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to Plaintiff and to all counsel.	
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13	Dated this 13th day of March, 2014.	
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15	Marshy Melins	
16	Marsha J. Pechman	
17	United States Chief District Judge	
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